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In this paper we estimate the amount of tax evasion in customs authorities in both Kenya and 
Tanzania by calculating measurement errors in reported trade flows between the two countries 
and correlate those errors with tax rates. We find that the measurement error is correlated with 
the tax rates in both Kenya and Tanzania. According to the Transparency International 
Corruption Perceptions Index, Kenya is more corrupt than Tanzania, but we find that the 
coefficient on tax is higher in Tanzania compared to Kenya implying that tax evasion on 
imported goods is higher in Tanzania compared to the Kenya. We also introduced a third 
country into our analysis, the United Kingdom, and tax evasion seems to be more severe in 
trade flows between Kenya and Tanzania compared to trade flows between the United 
Kingdom and Kenya/Tanzania. Finally we also find that the tax evasion coefficient is lower in 
the Kenya-United Kingdom case compared to the Tanzanian-United Kingdom case which 
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1. Introduction 
Building the capacity of low-income countries to mobilize more tax revenues is now at the 
top of the development policy agenda. Tax-systems have undergone some major changes 
since the mid-1990s, and the reform-process is expected to continue. Some of the important 
changes expected are: a simplification of the tax-regime, including broadening of the tax-
base; rationalization of the exemption-system to avoid further erosion of the tax-base; and 
review/change of tariff-rates and introduction of revenue- raising measures to compensate for 
possible losses arising from further liberalization of the trade-regime. Another important 
change is to improve the efficiency of the tax administration itself. A number of African 
countries have implemented comprehensive reforms of their tax administration. Part of the 
exercise has been to establish autonomous revenue authorities, which would be less 
vulnerable to political intervention and tax evasion practices. Although the empirical evidence 
is mixed, it seems that these ‘independent’ authorities in some countries have not helped to 
reduce tax evasion and corruption (Fjeldstad and Rakner, 2003). According to the 
Transparency International Corruption Perception Index Tanzania is ranked as number 88 and 
Kenya as number 144 out of 158 rankings in 2005 (Transparency International (TI), 2005). In 
the Kenyan case, a more detailed analysis shows that the overall bribery index has declined 
over the years (TI-Kenya bribery reports, various issues). The Kenyan tax authority has 
improved its overall index over the period 2002 – 2004 and it was ranked as one of the most 
improved organizations within the country in 2004. Corrupt practices have also been reported 
within the tax administration in Tanzania (Ehrhart and Mwaipopo, 2003 and Fjeldstad and 
Rakner, 2003).  
 
In this paper we estimate the amount of tax evasion in both Kenya and Tanzania. Following 
the methodology outlined by Fisman and Wei (2004) we compare the discrepancy in 
Tanzania’s recorded imports from Kenya with Kenya’s recorded exports to Tanzania. The 
same approach, but opposite, is used to evaluate tax evasion on the Kenyan side. The trade 
gap is assumed to be a proxy for tax evasion. In principal the reported trade flows should be 
the same, assuming no evasion (and measurement errors). In their study on China, Fisman and 
Wei (2004) matched the measurement error with product-specific tax rates and found that the 
measurement error is highly correlated with Chinese tax rates. A novel feature of their 
approach is that they were able to differentiate between three different aspects of tax evasion:  -3- 
underreporting of unit value, underreporting of taxable quantities, and mislabelling a higher-
taxed product as a lower-taxed type. 
 
In the paper we present some evidence of tax evasion in both Kenya and Tanzania. By 
studying the developments over a number of years we are also able to report if tax evasion in 
customs agencies is improving or worsening over time. Furthermore, introducing a third 
country, the United Kingdom (UK), enables us to compare tax evasion not only between two 
developing countries but also between a developed and a developing country. Finally, using 
the method of Pritchett and Sethi (1994), we examine the responsiveness of tariff revenues to 
tax rates for Kenya and Tanzania respectively and use those results as a robustness check of 
the other results obtained in this paper. 
  
The paper proceeds as follows: in the next section we give a brief overview of the theory of 
tax evasion and related empirical studies. Section three describes the methodology and the 
data used in the study. The empirical results are presented and analyzed in section four. 
Finally, conclusions are provided in the closing section. 
 
2. Tax evasion – theory and empirics 
A number of theoretical models have been developed which aim to incorporate tax evasion. 
The seminal work in the area is Allingham and Sandmo (1972) who created a model based on 
a risk-averse tax payer and the outcome of the model shows that a higher penalty rate or a 
higher probability of detection tends to discourage tax evasion and that a higher tax rate will 
induce more tax evasion. More recent studies have questioned the expected utility 
maximization framework of the Allingham-Sandmo model (A-S model) due to the poor fit to 
observed behaviour of choice under uncertainty. For example, Eide (2002) replaced the 
expected utility with a rank-dependent expected utility, which resulted in a more restricted 
model, but the comparative statics of the evading person were still the same as before. 
Another critique of the A-S model is that it isolates the decision to evade from other types of 
economic decision, e.g. the decision to work in the informal market. Sandmo (2004) sketches 
an extension of the A-S model to allow for a labour-leisure choice in the utility function, 
mirroring the choice between hours spent to earn regular income and hours spent either on 
leisure or on informal market activities.  
  -4- 
The theoretical literature is often concerned with evasion by individual taxpayers, but firms 
can also be evaders of indirect taxes. The seminal work in this area is Marrelli (1984) who 
extended the A-S model to fit a risk-averse firm instead and established results very similar to 
the A-S model. In a later study Marrelli and Martina (1988) extended the Marrelli (1984) 
work to an oligopolistic framework with strategic interaction between firms. More recently 
the research about the connection between firm behaviour and tax evasion has shifted 
attention from indirect taxes to corporate income taxes (Chen and Chu, 2002 and Crocker and 
Slemrod, 2003). According to this literature, the theoretical framework of the A-S model is 
inadequate since the model does not distinguish between ownership and control of a firm, 
which is crucial since the choice of evasion depends on who is penalized. A recent review of 
the literature of tax evasion has shown that the theoretical predictions of the effect of tax rates 
on evasion are dependent on modelling assumptions (Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2000). Hence, 
empirical studies would be useful both from a theoretical and policy perspective.  
 
Pritchett and Sethi (1994) examine the relation between tariff revenues and tariff rates using 
data from Jamaica, Kenya, and Pakistan. They find a weak relation between de facto tariff 
rates, calculated by dividing tariff revenues with import values for each product, and statutory 
rates. Fisman and Wei (2004) analyze the effect of tax rates on tax evasion in the trade flow 
between Hong Kong and China, and they note that the evasion gap is highly correlated with 
tax rates: much revenue is lost on products with higher tax rates. The point estimates suggest 
that China’s average tax rate on its imports is already on the wrong side of the Laffer curve: 
any increase in the tax rate is likely to produce a reduction rather than an increase in tax 
revenue. On average, a one percentage point increase in the tax rate induces a three per cent 
increase in evasion. They also conclude that practices such as underreporting import unit 
values and mislabelling higher-taxed products, as lower-taxed varieties are widespread. 
 
One important area where tax evasion has been reported to be a severe problem is customs 
duties. There are to our knowledge only a few studies in this area focussed on African data. 
For instance, in Mozambique there are substantial differences between the policy stance as 
given in the published tariff rates and de facto trade policy (Arndt and Tarp, 2003). Overall, 
the actual tariff revenue in 1997 was slightly less than 40 per cent of the level projected by the 
de jure tariff rates and estimated import volumes. Similarly Tsikata (1999) finds large 
discrepancies for Tanzania between revenues as implied by the published tariff and estimated 
import volumes versus actual receipts. The differences are explained by a combination of  -5- 
(legal) exemptions; corruption/smuggling across official entry points (ports and roads) and 
smuggling across unofficial entry points (unguarded borders). 
 
A study by Mpango (1996) focused on measuring the magnitude of deliberate under-invoicing 
of imports in Tanzania and the related motivating factors. The magnitude of deliberate 
aggregate under-invoicing of imports was found to be about 20 per cent, induced by high 
scheduled tariff rates, vigorous exchange rate adjustment, low salaries and minimal incentives 
offered to the customs staff, and opportunities for evasion offered by commodity 
heterogeneity. The issue of tax evasion as a factor that contributes to poor tax performance is 
also discussed in Mwinyimvua (1996), who cites avenues of evasion of import duties and 
sales and excise taxes to include under-invoicing, smuggling, use of tax exemptions, and 
complex tax schedules, excessive documentation, and corruption.  
 
3. Methodology and data 
In this study we will focus on four issues. The first is whether there is any correlation between 
the measurement error, as reported by the trade gap, and the tax rate in both Tanzania and 
Kenya.1 This is done in two ways, where we first utilize data on imports and exports reported 
in values and secondly we utilize data on imports and exports reported in quantities. The 
second issue that we want to analyze is whether the trade gap is due to mislabelling a higher-
taxed product as a lower-taxed type or not, using both value and quantity data. Thirdly, we 
will also analyze if there is any difference in the magnitude of the coefficient on tax rate in the 
two countries. If the answer is yes, that would imply that tax evasion is more severe in that 
particular country. Finally, we introduce a third country into our analysis, the UK, which 
enables us to undertake a similar analysis between the UK and Kenya and Tanzania 
respectively.  
 
As mentioned the methodology follows Fisman and Wei (2004). For every product that 
country A imports from country B, the value of exports (Export_value) is defined as the value 
reported by country B and the import value (Import_value) as that reported by country A. 
Furthermore, the export quantity (Export_qty) is defined as the quantity of exports reported by 
                                                 
1 In this study legal import tax exemptions are accounted for. The gap between exports and imports includes all 
registered trade-flows including legal exemptions. As statutory tax rates are used in the regressions the results 
are not affected by any difference in legal exemptions between the two countries. However, using de facto tax 
rates (as in section 4.4) legal exemptions could affect the results.  -6- 
country B and the quantity of imports (Import_qty) is defined as the quantity of imports 
reported by country A. We define the evasion gap in values (Gap_value) to be given by the 
difference between the logged values of exports and imports measured in values and the gap 
in quantities reported (Gap_qty) by the same difference measured in quantities.2 
 
The basic issue that we will investigate is if the difference between exports and imports is 
increasing in the tax rate (Taxrate), due to evasion (Equation 3.1): 
  01 i Gap_value Taxrate ii β βε =+× +  (3.1) 
where subindex i denotes products and (Taxrate) denotes product specific tax rates (tariffs 
plus value-added tax rates, where tariffs include import duties and excise duties) in the 
importing country. If evasion is induced by tax rate we expect  1 0 β > . The interpretation of 
1 β  (if  1 β  = 3 for example) will be that if the tax rate increases by one percentage point, the 
gap between reported exports and imports increases by three per cent.  
 
The approach in this study is that tax rates are implicitly supposed exogenous in the equation 
explaining tax evasion. It is however possible that a strong evasion on a product incites the 
government to reduce tax rates. This is probably more likely when it comes to local 
government taxes. For example, in Tanzania several nuisance taxes were recently abolished 
(Levin, 2005). Import duties and value added taxes, which are the focus in this study, are less 
likely to be endogenous and particularly when a country is a member of a regional integration 
zone.3 
 
Due to the problem that part of tax evasion does not only take the form of underreporting but 
also of mislabelling imports, Fisman and Wei (2004) assume that this type of mislabelling is 
                                                 
2 The ideal way to measure the gap is to use import values and export values exclusive of CIF/FOB. However, 
by regressing gap_qty on tax_rate this problem is circumvented and this results in similar β -values. In the cases 
where values are used instead of quantities, the CIF-FOB problem creates a gap value, but there is no reason why 
it should be correlated with the tax_rate. The same discussion also holds, according to us, in the case of errors. 
3  Kenya and Tanzania are both members of the East African Community (EAC). Kenya is a member of 
COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa), which Tanzania left in 1999. Tanzania is still a 
member of SADC (Southern African Development Community). Tanzania decided to leave COMESA mainly 
because its regional integration interests were thought to be better served by its membership in SADC. Concerns 
about revenue losses as a result of ongoing COMESA trade liberalization are also believed to have contributed to 
the decision. Nevertheless, Tanzania continues to be influenced by trade policy developments in COMESA, not 
least because the two other current EAC members, Kenya and Uganda, are both members of COMESA.  -7- 
easier among similar products. Therefore, the average tax variable (Avg(tax_o)) is defined as 
being the average level of tax rate of all other products in a goods 4-digit class, weighted by 
the export value. Adding the average tax variable to the right hand side of the regression 
function gives the following (Equation 3.2): 
  01 i2 i Gap_value Taxrate Avg(tax_o) ii β ββ ε =+× +× + . (3.2) 
If evasion by mislabelling is a problem, one would expect  2 β  to be negative, i.e. the lower the 
tax rate on product i’s similar varieties, the greater the incentive for mislabelling the import of 
product i. 
 
So far we have dealt with evasion in values, but evasion in quantities by underreporting may 
also be common. For that reason, the following regressions will also be examined: 
  01 i _T a x r a t e ii Gap qty β βε =+× +  (3.3) 
and 
  01 i2 i _ Taxrate Avg(tax_o) ii Gap qty β ββ ε =+× +× +  (3.4) 
If underreporting in quantities is established, one would expect  1 0 β >  in equation (3.3) and if 
mislabelling of imports is established, one would expect  2 0 β <  in equation (3.4). 
 
The trade data used in the study is taken from the COMTRADE database, maintained by the 
United Nations (UN), and is recorded according to the Harmonized Commodity Description 
and Coding System (HS) at six-digit level. The years used in this study are 2000, 2002 and 
2004 recorded according to HS (1996).4 The Tanzanian Tax Authority provided data on tariff 
and tax rates at the eight-digit HS level for the year 2000. The Kenyan data were provided by 
the Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research Analysis (KIPPRA).5 
 
                                                 
4 Data from 2003 has been used as well in the analysis and the results are available on request.  
5 Since the trade data are available at the six-digit HS level, an aggregation of the tax data is necessary. In most 
of the cases there were uniform tax rates among those eight-digit HS products belonging to a single six-digit HS 
product group. In a few cases where there were variations in tax rates, we used the tax rate at eight-digit HS level 
with the highest import value to represent the six-digit HS level.  -8- 
Tables 3.1–3.4 describe some characteristics of the variables used in the study. An important 
difference between the two countries is in the number of observations. Kenya has a more 
diversified export structure, which implies that a larger number of Kenyan products are 
entering the Tanzanian market compared to Tanzanian products entering the Kenyan market 
(Tables 3.1-3.2). Thus, the number of observations in measuring tax evasion in Tanzania is 
larger than in the Kenyan case. This is also the case when analyzing evasion between the UK 
and the two African countries. 
 
Table 3.1 Summary statistics of trade flows from Kenya to Tanzania, 
full sample year 2004 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
log(Export_value) 733  10.09  2.05  6.24  16.08 
log(Import_value) 733  9.76  1.81  6.22  15.61 
Gap_value 733  0.33  1.81  -6.59  6.55 
log(Export_qty) 566  9.65  2.65  0.00  17.05 
log(Import_qty) 566  9.55  2.26  2.20  16.51 
Gap_qty 566  0.10  2.09  -7.97  6.59 
Taxrate (tariff + VAT)  733  0.37  0.13  0.00  0.80 
Avg(tax_o) (at HS4-digit)  531  0.37  0.13  0.00  0.75 
Note: Summary statistics from the balanced data, i.e. those observations containing data on 
both export- and import values. 
 
Table 3.2 Summary statistics of trade flows from Tanzania to Kenya, 
full sample year 2004 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
log(Export_value) 160  10.12  1.87  6.23  16.85 
log(Import_value) 160  9.83  1.99  6.24  14.78 
Gap_value 160  0.29  1.76  -4.37  8.06 
log(Export_qty) 109  10.90  2.75  4.44  16.88 
log(Import_qty) 109  10.63  2.78  3.14  20.28 
Gap_qty 109  0.27  2.64  -8.99  8.17 
Taxrate (tariff + VAT)  160  0.31  0.16  0.00  1.13 
Avg(tax_o) (at HS4-digit)  71  0.30  0.14  0.00  0.69 
Note: Summary statistics from the balanced data, i.e. those observations containing data on 
both export- and import values. 
  -9- 
Table 3.3 Summary statistics of trade flows from the UK to Tanzania, 
full sample year 2002 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
log(Export_value) 465  9.89  1.79  6.87  15.57 
log(Import_value) 465  10.15  1.81  6.23  15.43 
Gap_value 465  -0.26  1.77  -4.63  6.34 
log(Export_qty) 465  7.35  2.85  0.00  16.03 
log(Import_qty) 465  8.47  2.09  0.69  15.71 
Gap_qty 465  -1.12  2.53  -9.68  6.17 
Taxrate (tariff + VAT)  465  0.37  0.13  0.00  0.80 
Avg(tax_o) (at HS4-digit)  310  0.37  0.13  0.00  0.75 
Note: Summary statistics from the balanced data, i.e. those observations containing data on 
both export- and import values. 
 
Table 3.4 Summary statistics of trade flows from the UK to Kenya, full 
sample year 2002 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
log(Export_value) 1320  10.10  1.80  6.25  16.88 
log(Import_value) 1320  10.09  1.82  6.22  16.14 
Gap_value 1320  0.01  1.79  -5.91  8.31 
log(Export_qty) 843  7.82  2.44  0.00  16.88 
log(Import_qty) 839  7.86  2.69  0.00  16.51 
Gap_qty 839  -0.04  2.58  -9.62  11.08 
Taxrate (tariff + VAT)  1320  0.34  0.15  0.00  1.78 
Avg(tax_o) (at HS4-digit)  1078  0.33  0.15  0.00  1.78 
Note: Summary statistics from the balanced data, i.e. those observations containing data on 
both export- and import values. 
 
The average measurement error (Gap_value) variable in the trade statistics has an average 
value of 0.33 in Tanzania compared to 0.29 in the Kenyan case (Tables 3.1-3.2). The average 
error value between the UK and Tanzania is -0.26 and 0.01 between Kenya and the UK 
(Tables 3.3–3.4).6 These results indicate that measurement errors (values) in the trade data are 
on average higher between Kenya and Tanzania compared with the UK and Kenya and 
Tanzania respectively. With regard to quantities, measurements errors follow a similar 
pattern: Tanzania’s calculated errors are higher than Kenya’s. These results indicate that there 
is some tax evasion also in physical quantities. One interesting observation from Tables 3.1–
3.4 is that the average measurement error value is higher than the average error measured in 
quantities, indicating that some evasion takes the form of underreporting of per unit values. 
 
The average tax rate in Tanzania is 37% with a maximum of 80% (Tables 3.1 and 3.3) and in 
Kenya the average value is between 31-34% with a maximum tax rate at 178% (Tables 3.2 
                                                 
6  The average measurement errors as a share of the average export value are 0.30, 0.25, 0.30 and 0.01 
respectively in the four data sets.  -10- 
and 3.4).7 This shows that the average tax rate is higher in Tanzania than in Kenya and that 
the spread of the tax rate is higher in Kenya. This indicates that a tax authority official in 
Tanzania can gain more from involvement in tax evasion than a similar official in Kenya. 
 
4. Empirical results 
In this section the empirical results are presented, based on the four regression equations 
outlined in the previous section. The first issue to be analyzed is whether there is any 
correlation between measurement errors, both in value terms and quantities, and tax rates in 
each of the two countries Tanzania and Kenya. The second issue is if the measurement errors 
are due to mislabelling of higher-taxed into lower-taxed products. The third issue is whether 
there is a difference in magnitudes and over time of tax evasion in the two countries. Finally, 
to check the results the analysis is repeated with a pair-wise comparison between Kenya and 
the UK and Tanzania and the UK. 
 
4.1 Tax evasion in Tanzania 
The result for the degree of tax evasion in Tanzania in the year 2004 is reported in Table 4.1. 
Column 1 indicates that a one-percentage point increase in the tax rate leads to a 3.8 percent 
increase in tax evasion. When excluding outliers8, the coefficient on tax rate changes to 2.9 
(Column 2). In column 3 the sample is restricted by excluding observations lacking 
information on taxes on similar products and in the fourth column the sample is constrained 
by excluding observations with missing information on quantities. The rationale for doing the 
latter is that we want to compare regressions on values with those on quantities. In columns 5-
7 several of the restrictions are used simultaneously, which is a sensitivity check for the main 
results. 
 
As can be seen from Table 4.1, the coefficient on tax rate is in the range of 2.6-4.4. Analyzing 
the results of the remaining years, the tax rate coefficient is significant in all specifications, 
except for 2002 (Tables A.1–A.2). The value of the coefficient ranges from 1.4-4.4 which 
indicates that a one percentage point increase in the average tax rate in Tanzania will lead to a 
                                                 
7 The products with a tax rate above 100% are exclusively spirits, cigarettes and other products of tobacco, and 
they comprise approximately 0.8% of total imports into Kenya from the UK in 2004. 
8  Outliers defined as those observations with the highest and lowest 5 percent of values or quantities of 
Gap_Value or Gap_Qty, respectively, are excluded.  -11- 
1.5-4.5 percent increase in the gap value. In addition, the coefficient is at its highest value in 
2004 indicating that tax evasion has been increasing over time.  
 
Table 4.1 The effect of tax rates on evasion (measured in values) in year 2004 in the 
trade flow from Kenya to Tanzania 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 




























Excluding  outliers  No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes 
Excluding products 
lacking tax on similar 
products 
No No Yes No No Yes Yes 
Excluding products 
lacking observations on 
quantities 
No No No Yes Yes No Yes 
#  observations  733 659 531 566 508 477 369 
R
2  0.07 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.06 0.07 
Note: Robust t-values in parentheses, accounting for clustering of standard errors by four-digit HS code. *** 
indicates significance at 1% level; ** at 5% level; and * at 10% level respectively. 
 
The second issue was whether the measured trade gap is due to mislabelling a higher taxed 
product as a lower taxed similar variant or not. If evasion by mislabelling is a problem, one 
would expect the coefficient on tax on similar products to be negative. Column 1 in Table 4.2 
reports the estimate of the sensitivity of evasion on tax on similar products and column 2 
reports the estimates of the sensitivity of evasion on tax rate and on tax on similar products. In 
columns 3-5 the sample are restricted by excluding outliers, excluding products lacking 
observations on quantities or both. 
  -12- 
Table 4.2 Incorporating the average tax on similar products (measured in values) in 
year 2004 in the trade flow from Kenya to Tanzania 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 




























Excluding outliers  No No Yes No Yes 
Excluding products lacking observations 
on quantities  No No No Yes  Yes 
# observations  531 531 478 411 372 
R
2  0.06 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.08 
Note: Robust t-values in parentheses, accounting for clustering of standard errors by four-digit HS code. *** 
indicates significance at 1% level; ** at 5% level; and * at 10% level respectively. 
 
When including the tax rate on similar products as regressor (Table 4.2) the coefficient on tax 
decreases (compare Tables 4.1 and 4.2) and the coefficient on tax on similar products is 
positive and significant in column 4.9 These results indicate that mislabelling is not present in 
the data. Analyzing the remaining years in the sample, there is no evidence that mislabelling 
explains tax evasion in values (Tables A.3 – A.4). The same conclusion holds when the data 
is based on quantities (Tables A.5 – A.7). 
 
4.2 Tax evasion in Kenya 
As Kenya is ranked considerably lower than Tanzania in the Transparency International 
Perception Index, one might suspect that tax evasion is a significantly larger problem in 
Kenya compared to Tanzania. However, Table 4.3 shows that the tax rate coefficient is below 
the corresponding estimates for Tanzania and it is only significant in column 1. For the other 
years in the study the coefficient on tax rate is insignificant in all specifications for 2000 and 
2002 (Tables A.8 – A.9). 
 
                                                 
9 This result is probably driven by outliers since when excluding those (column 5), the coefficient on tax on 
similar products become insignificant.  -13- 
Table 4.3 The effect of tax rates on evasion (measured in values) in year 2004 in the 
trade flow from Tanzania to Kenya 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 




























Excluding  outliers  No Yes No  No Yes Yes Yes 
Excluding products lacking tax 
on similar products  No No Yes No No Yes  Yes 
Excluding products lacking 
observations on quantities  No No No Yes  Yes No Yes 
No. of observations  160  144  71  110  98  63  43 
R
2  0.03 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 
Note: Robust t-values in parentheses, accounting for clustering of standard errors by four-digit HS code. *** 
indicates significance at 1% level; ** at 5% level; and * at 10% level respectively. 
 
Table 4.4 provides some evidence on whether evasion is due to mislabelling or not. The 
coefficient on tax rate is found to be positive and significant and the coefficient on tax on 
similar products to be negative and significant.  Looking at the other years of the study 
significant results is found in the 2000 regressions (Tables A.10 – A.11). However, the results 
from most of the years are probably affected by the low number of observations10 or are 
driven by outliers.11 
                                                 
10 This is sometimes labelled micronumerosity. Due to the low number of observations, the variable tax on 
similar products will be almost collinear with the variable tax rate, which is probably why we get those results. 
As a consequence, the variable tax on similar products could not be included in the 2002 regression because it 
was fully collinear with the tax rate in this year. 
11 We have also performed pooled OLS using all years and the results are virtually identical to those previously 
reported. Results from these estimations are available on request from the authors.  -14- 
Table 4.4 Incorporating the average tax on similar products (measured in values) in 
year 2004 in the trade flow from Tanzania to Kenya 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 




























Excluding  outliers  No No Yes No Yes 
Excluding products lacking 
observations on quantities  No No No Yes  Yes 
No.  of  observations  71 71 63 49 42 
R
2  0.02 0.08 0.16 0.06 0.07 
Note: Robust t-values in parentheses, accounting for clustering of standard errors by four-digit HS code. *** 
indicates significance at 1% level; ** at 5% level; and * at 10% level respectively. 
 
When using data on physical quantities instead of values the coefficients on tax rate and on 
tax on similar products are insignificant in almost all specifications and years. Thus, in 
general there is no evidence of tax evasion in physical quantities or of mislabelling (Tables 
A.12 – A.14). 
 
The conclusions that can be drawn so far from the empirics presented above in this section are 
first that there is evidence of underreporting in values and in quantities in the trade flow from 
Kenya to Tanzania for the years 2000 and 2004. Second, tax evasion does not take the form of 
mislabelling from a higher taxed product to a lower taxed variant regardless of year or trade 
flow. Third, there is some evidence of underreporting of values but not in quantities in the 
trade flow from Tanzania to Kenya. Fourth, there is no evidence of mislabelling from a higher 
taxed product to a lower taxed variant in both values and quantities. Fifth, the magnitude of 
the coefficient on tax rate is higher in the Tanzanian case compared to the Kenyan case 
indicating more tax evasion in Tanzania compared to Kenya. 
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4.3 Tax evasion between Tanzania/Kenya and the UK. 
In order to check whether the Tanzanian tax authority is less efficient compared to the Kenyan 
counterpart a third country is introduced into the analysis, the UK.12  Table 4.5 shows that in 
2002 the coefficient on tax rate is significant in most specifications in the trade flow from the 
UK to Tanzania with a value ranging between 1.0 – 1.8. The coefficient is also significant for 
some specifications in 2000 and show a slightly lower value compared to the results for the 
year 2002 (Table A.15). Irrespective of using values or quantities, there is no evidence of 
mislabelling from a higher taxed product to a lower taxed variant for the two years (Tables 
A.16-A.19). The interpretation of these results is that tax evasion still occurs in Tanzania but 
at a lower degree compared to goods entering from the Kenyan market. 
 
Table 4.5 The effect of tax rates on evasion (measured in values) in year 2002 in the 
trade flow from the UK to Tanzania 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6)  (7) 




























Excluding  outliers  No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes 
Excluding products lacking 
tax on similar products  No No Yes  No No Yes Yes 
Excluding products lacking 
observations on quantities  No No No  Yes  Yes No Yes 
No. of observations  465  417  310  465  417  278  278 
R
2  0.01 0.01 0.02  0.01 0.01  0.02  0.02 
Note: Robust t-values in parentheses, accounting for clustering of standard errors by four-digit HS code. *** 
indicates significance at 1% level; ** at 5% level; and * at 10% level respectively. 
 
When repeating the analysis using data from Kenya and the UK instead, Table 4.6 shows that 
the coefficient on tax rate is insignificant in all specifications. The coefficient is also 
insignificant for all specifications in 2000 (Table A.20). This indicates that there is no tax 
evasion present in the data from those years. There are also insignificant results when 
including the variable tax on similar products in both 2000 and 2002 (Tables A.21 and A.22) 
except in column 5 in 2002, where there is evidence of mislabelling a higher taxed product as 
                                                 
12 The methodology used in this paper requires a certain amount of trade between the two countries used in the 
analysis. The United Kingdom has been chosen, as it is an important trading partner for both Kenya and 
Tanzania.     -16- 
a lower taxed variant. The results do not change when using data on quantities instead (Tables 
A.23 and A.24). 
 
Table 4.6 The effect of tax rates on evasion (measured in values) in year 2002 in the 
trade flow from the UK to Kenya 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 




























Excluding  outliers  No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes 
Excluding products lacking tax 
on similar products 
No No Yes No No Yes Yes 
Excluding products lacking 
observations on quantities 
No No No Yes  Yes No Yes 
No. of observations  1320  1188  1078  843  757  970  593 
R
2  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Note: Robust t-values in parentheses, accounting for clustering of standard errors by four-digit HS code. *** 
indicates significance at 1% level; ** at 5% level; and * at 10% level respectively. 
 
When looking at tax evasion from a third country perspective, we find that the Tanzanian 
customs authority is still less efficient than the Kenyan counterpart. This is based on the fact 
that the null hypothesis, that the coefficient on tax rate is equal to zero, cannot be rejected in 
the UK to Kenya case while it can be rejected in the UK to Tanzania case. 
 
4.4 Robustness check. 
The results so far show that tax evasion is more severe in Tanzania compared to Kenya, even 
when using data on trade flows from United Kingdom to the two countries. As robustness 
check of those results we follow Pritchett and Sethi (1994) and regress the collected tariff rate 
on the official tariff rate, i.e. (equation 4.1). 
  () 01 i  (  ) i i Collected rate Official rate β βε =+× + , (4.1) 
where the collected rate is calculated as the ratio of import tax revenues to import value. 
Bilateral trade data between Kenya and Tanzania are used together with Tanzanian tariff rates 
when estimating equation 4.1 for Tanzania and Kenyan tariff rates when estimating for 
Kenya. 
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Table 4.7. Estimation Results of Regressing the Collected Rate on the Official Rate 
 Kenya  Tanzania 
Type of OLS regression  Coefficient  R
2  Coefficient R
2 
Linear 0.73  0.24  0.68  0.09 
 (0.10)    (0.04)   
Weighted by import values  0.73  0.24  0.68  0.09 
 (0.10)    (0.04)   
Weighted by official rate  0.60  0.17  0.68  0.13 
 (0.08)    (0.04)   
Linear, excl. obs. where the   0.75  0.23  0.68  0.09 
collected rate is zero  (0.11)    (0.04)   
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. For the first three regressions, the number of observations for 
Kenya is 272; and for Tanzania is 1704. When zero collected rates are excluded, the numbers of observations do 
not change for Tanzania; and fall to 241 for Kenya. 
 
The results in Table 4.7 are based on regressing the collected rate for each tariff on products 
on the official rate. In the first row a simple linear model is used and for each country the 
slope is statistically significant from one. An increase of 1 percentage point in the official rate 
produces only 0.73 percentage points increase in the collected rate in Kenya and 0.68 
percentage points in Tanzania. The subsequent rows of Table 4.7 verify this basic result. The 
second and third rows show results from weighted ordinary least squares, using import values 
as weights in row two and statutory tariff rate in row three. Those rows show coefficients that 
are the same or lower than the unweighted results. The fourth row excludes those products for 
which the collection rate is zero even though recorded import values are positive. The 
coefficient rose slightly in the Kenyan case but remained constant in the Tanzanian case since 
no products were excluded. The results in Table 4.7 seem to support our previous results that 




In this paper we use the Fisman and Wei (2004) approach in measuring the effect of tax rates 
on tax evasion using data on the trade flow between Kenya and Tanzania. Unlike Fisman and 
Wei, we estimate the amount of tax evasion in the trade flows between the two countries in 
both directions. In the Tanzanian case, on the one hand, we find evidence of underreporting of 
unit value for all years except 2002. The coefficient on tax rate is around 2.3 in 2000 and 
around 3.5 in 2004. This indicates that the problem of tax evasion has increased over the 
                                                 
13  These results have to be interpreted with some caution since using de facto tax rates in the regression 
(equation 4.1), legal exemptions might affect the results.  -18- 
investigated period. When utilizing data on quantities, the above stated results barely change. 
In the Kenyan case, on the other hand, we find some evidence of underreporting in unit values 
for the year 2004. The coefficient on tax rate is around 1.8 in 2004 indicating a small (or no) 
increase in the coefficient over the years. When utilizing data on quantities, the coefficient is 
insignificant for all years except in one specification in 2004 where it is 2.6 and significant at 
the 10% level. Since tax evasion may not only take the form of underreporting but also of the 
mislabelling of imports, we investigate whether the measured trade gap is due to mislabelling 
a higher taxed product as a lower taxed similar variant or not. The regressions on Tanzania 
show no evidence that mislabelling is present in the data. In the Kenyan case, however, we 
find some evidence of mislabelling, but this might be due to a problem of micronumerosity. 
 
This paper also provides an extension of the Fisman and Wei approach by including a third 
country into the investigations, the United Kingdom. By doing this we are able to capture 
whether there is any difference in tax evasion behaviour in the trade between two developing 
countries and between a developed and the two developing countries respectively. In the 
regressions on Tanzania there is evidence of tax evasion in values with a coefficient on tax 
rate ranging between 0.9 – 1.8, while in the regressions on Kenya there is no evidence of tax 
evasion. Moreover, there is almost no evidence of mislabelling in the regressions on either 
Kenya or Tanzania. In 2002 the coefficient on tax on similar products takes on values of -1.2 
in the value regression and -1.1 in the quantity regression on Kenya. 
 
Furthermore, this paper provides evidence that tax evasion (on imported goods) is more 
severe in Tanzania compared to Kenya. The coefficient on tax rate is higher in Tanzania in all 
years except 2002 when it is insignificant for both countries. These results are also supported 
in the regressions using data on the trade flows from the UK to the two countries respectively. 
In order to find out whether these results are robust or not, we followed Pritchett and Sethi 
(1994) and examined the responsiveness of tariff revenues to tax rates for the two countries 
respectively and the results corroborated with our earlier results. 
 
One shortcoming of the methodology used in this study is due to the fact that it needs a 
certain number of products traded between the specific countries analysed and many 
developing countries do not have a well diversified export sector. This gives us a limited 
sample of countries, for example in Africa, which we can use to perform these kinds of 
studies.  -19- 
 
We showed that the Kenyan customs authority were more efficient than the Tanzanian 
counterpart for the period measured, although Kenya was more corrupt than Tanzania 
according to the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index. One policy 
recommendation, due to this, is that one should not use an aggregate index as an indicator of 
reforming a specific sector of the economy (e.g. the customs union). 
 
An interesting task for future studies is to remake this study using data collected after the 
formation of the customs union including Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda (East African 
Community, EAC)14 in late 2004. When trade data is available for 2005 and 2006 one can use 
it to test whether tax evasion still prevails in the trade data between the countries in the union. 
One further extension might be to treat the customs union as a single country and study the 
effect of tax evasion on tax rate in the trade between the union and the UK for example. 
                                                 
14 See www.eac.int.  -20- 
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Appendix 
 
Table A.1 The effect of tax rates on evasion (measured in values) in year 2000 in the 
trade flow from Kenya to Tanzania 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 




























Excluding  outliers  No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes 
Excluding products 
lacking tax on similar 
products 
No No Yes No No Yes Yes 
Excluding products 
lacking observations on 
quantities 
No No No Yes Yes No Yes 
#  observations  767 681 549 546 490 493 344 
R
2  0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.03 
Note: Robust t-values in parentheses, accounting for clustering of standard errors by four-digit HS code. *** 
indicates significance at 1% level; ** at 5% level; and * at 10% level respectively. 
 
Table A.2 The effect of tax rates on evasion (measured in values) in year 2002 in the 
trade flow from Kenya to Tanzania 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 




























Excluding  outliers  No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes 
Excluding products lacking tax 
on similar products  No No Yes No No Yes Yes 
Excluding products lacking 
observations on quantities  No No No Yes Yes No Yes 
#  observations  695 625 485 531 477 435 324 
R
2  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Note: Robust t-values in parentheses, accounting for clustering of standard errors by four-digit HS code. *** 
indicates significance at 1% level; ** at 5% level; and * at 10% level respectively. 
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Table A.3 Incorporating the average tax on similar products (measured in values) in 
year 2000 in the trade flow from Kenya to Tanzania 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 




























Excluding  outliers  No No Yes No Yes 
Excluding products lacking 
observations on quantities  No No No Yes  Yes 
#  observations  549 549 484 384 338 
R
2  0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 
Note: Robust t-values in parentheses, accounting for clustering of standard errors by four-digit HS code. *** 
indicates significance at 1% level; ** at 5% level; and * at 10% level respectively. 
 
Table A.4 Incorporating the average tax on similar products (measured in values) in 
year 2002 in the trade flow from Kenya to Tanzania 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 




























Excluding  outliers  No No Yes No Yes 
Excluding products lacking 
observations on quantities  No No No Yes  Yes 
#  observations  485 485 443 360 330 
R
2  0.00 0.0  0 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Note: Robust t-values in parentheses, accounting for clustering of standard errors by four-digit HS code. *** 
indicates significance at 1% level; ** at 5% level; and * at 10% level respectively. 
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Table A.5 Evasion in physical quantities in year 2000 in the trade flow from Kenya to 
Tanzania 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 




























Excluding products lacking 
observations on Avg(Tax_o)  No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Excluding  outliers  No No Yes No No Yes 
#  observations  546 364 490 364 364 326 
R
2  0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 
Note: Robust t-values in parentheses, accounting for clustering of standard errors by four-digit HS code. *** 
indicates significance at 1% level; ** at 5% level; and * at 10% level respectively. 
 
Table A.6 Evasion in physical quantities in year 2002 in the trade flow from Kenya to 
Tanzania 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 




























Excluding products lacking 
observations on Avg(Tax_o)  No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Excluding  outliers  No No Yes No No Yes 
#  observations  528 331 474 331 331 297 
R
2  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Note: Robust t-values in parentheses, accounting for clustering of standard errors by four-digit HS code. *** 
indicates significance at 1% level; ** at 5% level; and * at 10% level respectively. 
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Table A.7 Evasion in physical quantities in year 2004 in the trade flow from Kenya to 
Tanzania 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 




























Excluding products lacking 
observations on Avg(Tax_o)  No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Excluding outliers  No No Yes No No Yes 
# observations  566 400 508 400 400 360 
R
2  0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 
Note: Robust t-values in parentheses, accounting for clustering of standard errors by four-digit HS code. *** 
indicates significance at 1% level; ** at 5% level; and * at 10% level respectively. 
 
Table A.8 The effect of tax rates on evasion (measured in values) in year 2000 in the 
trade flow from Tanzania to Kenya 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 




























Excluding  outliers  No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes 
Excluding products lacking tax 
on similar products  No  No Yes No No Yes Yes 
Excluding products lacking 
observations on quantities  No No No  Yes  Yes No  Yes 
No.  of  observations  76 68 30 58 52 26 20 
R
2  0.00 0.00 0.08 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 
Note: Robust t-values in parentheses, accounting for clustering of standard errors by four-digit HS code. *** 
indicates significance at 1% level; ** at 5% level; and * at 10% level respectively. 
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Table A.9 The effect of tax rates on evasion (measured in values) in year 2002 in the 
trade flow from Tanzania to Kenya 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 




























Excluding  outliers  No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes 
Excluding products lacking tax 
on similar products  No No Yes No No Yes Yes 
Excluding products lacking 
observations on quantities  No No No Yes Yes No Yes 
No.  of  observations  84 74 22 71 63 18 17 
R
2  0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.02 
Note: Robust t-values in parentheses, accounting for clustering of standard errors by four-digit HS code. *** 
indicates significance at 1% level; ** at 5% level; and * at 10% level respectively. 
 
Table A.10 Incorporating the average tax on similar products (measured in values) in 
year 2000 in the trade flow from Tanzania to Kenya 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 




























Excluding  outliers  No No Yes No Yes 
Excluding products lacking 
observations on quantities  No No No Yes  Yes 
No.  of  observations  30 30 25 24 19 
R
2  0.03 0.16 0.06 0.19 0.10 
Note: Robust t-values in parentheses, accounting for clustering of standard errors by four-digit HS code. *** 
indicates significance at 1% level; ** at 5% level; and * at10% level respectively. 
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Table A.11 Incorporating the average tax on similar products (measured in values) in 
year 2002 in the trade flow from Tanzania to Kenya 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 




























Excluding  outliers  No No Yes No Yes 
Excluding products lacking 
observations on quantities  No No No Yes  Yes 
No.  of  observations  22 22 18 19 15 
R
2  0.02 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.01 
Note: Robust t-values in parentheses, accounting for clustering of standard errors by four-digit HS code. *** 
indicates significance at 1% level; ** at 5% level; and * at10% level respectively. 
 
Table A.12 Evasion in physical quantities in year 2000 in the trade flow from 
Tanzania to Kenya 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 




























Excluding products lacking 
observations on Avg(Tax_o)  No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Excluding  outliers  No No Yes No No Yes 
No.  of  observations  58 21 52 21 21 17 
R
2  0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 
Note: Robust t-values in parentheses, accounting for clustering of standard errors by four-digit HS code. *** 
indicates significance at 1% level; ** at 5% level; and * at10% level respectively. 
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Table A.13 Evasion in physical quantities in year 2002 in the trade flow from 
Tanzania to Kenya 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 




























Excluding products lacking 
observations on Avg(Tax_o)  No Yes No Yes Yes  Yes 
Excluding  outliers  No No Yes No No  Yes 
No. of observations  71  18  63  18  18  16 
R
2  0.01 0.10 0.00 0.10 0.12 0.14 
Note: Robust t-values in parentheses, accounting for clustering of standard errors by four-digit HS code. *** 
indicates significance at 1% level; ** at 5% level; and * at10% level respectively. 
 
Table A.14 Evasion in physical quantities in year 2004 in the trade flow from 
Tanzania to Kenya 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 




























Excluding products lacking 
observations on Avg(Tax_o)  No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Excluding  outliers  No  No Yes No No Yes 
No.  of  observations  109  49 97 49 49 43 
R
2  0.02 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.05 
Note: Robust t-values in parentheses, accounting for clustering of standard errors by four-digit HS code. *** 
indicates significance at 1% level; ** at 5% level; and * at10% level respectively. 
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Table A.15 The effect of tax rates on evasion (measured in values) in year 2000 in 
the trade flow from the UK to Tanzania 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 




























Excluding outliers  No  Yes  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Excluding products 
lacking tax on similar 
products 




No No  No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes 
No. of observations  499  449  334  499  449  300  300 
R
2  0.01 0.01  0.02 0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 
Note: Robust t-values in parentheses, accounting for clustering of standard errors by four-digit HS code. *** 
indicates significance at 1% level; ** at 5% level; and * at10% level respectively. 
 
Table A.16 Incorporating the average tax on similar products (measured in values) in 
year 2000 in the trade flow from the UK to Tanzania 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 




























Excluding outliers  No  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Excluding products lacking 
observations on quantities  No No No Yes  Yes 
No.  of  observations  334 334 297 334 297 
R
2  0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 
Note: Robust t-values in parentheses, accounting for clustering of standard errors by four-digit HS code. *** 
indicates significance at 1% level; ** at 5% level; and * at10% level respectively.  -30- 
Table A.17 Incorporating the average tax on similar products (measured in values) in 
year 2002 in the trade flow from the UK to Tanzania 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 




























Excluding  outliers  No No Yes No Yes 
Excluding products lacking 
observations on quantities  No No No Yes  Yes 
No.  of  observations  310 310 280 310 280 
R
2  0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Note: Robust t-values in parentheses, accounting for clustering of standard errors by four-digit HS code. *** 
indicates significance at 1% level; ** at 5% level; and * at10% level respectively. 
 
Table A.18 Evasion in physical quantities in year 2000 in the trade flow from the UK 
to Tanzania 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 




























Excluding products lacking 
observations on 
Avg(Tax_o) 
No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Excluding outliers  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes 
No. of observations  499  334  449  334  334  300 
R
2  0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 
Note: Robust t-values in parentheses, accounting for clustering of standard errors by four-digit HS code. *** 
indicates significance at 1% level; ** at 5% level; and * at10% level respectively. 
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Table A.19 Evasion in physical quantities in year 2002 in the trade flow from the UK 
to Tanzania 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 




























Excluding products lacking 
observations on Avg(Tax_o)  No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Excluding outliers  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes 
No. of observations  465  310  417  310  310  278 
R
2  0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Note: Robust t-values in parentheses, accounting for clustering of standard errors by four-digit HS code. *** 
indicates significance at 1% level; ** at 5% level; and * at10% level respectively. 
 
Table A.20 The effect of tax rates on evasion (measured in values) in year 2000 in 
the trade flow from the UK to Kenya 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 




























Excluding outliers  No  Yes  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Excluding products lacking 
tax on similar products  No No Yes  No No Yes  Yes 
Excluding products lacking 
observations on quantities  No No No  Yes  Yes No Yes 
No. of observations  1411  1269  1161  810  728  1043  565 
R
2  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Note: Robust t-values in parentheses, accounting for clustering of standard errors by four-digit HS code. *** 
indicates significance at 1% level; ** at 5% level; and * at10% level respectively. 
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Table A.21 Incorporating the average tax on similar products (measured in values) in 
year 2000 in the trade flow from the UK to Kenya 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 




























Excluding outliers  No  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Excluding products lacking 
observations on quantities  No No No  Yes  Yes 
No. of observations  1161  1161  1039  629  560 
R
2  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Note: Robust t-values in parentheses, accounting for clustering of standard errors by four-digit HS code. *** 
indicates significance at 1% level; ** at 5% level; and * at10% level respectively. 
 
Table A.22 Incorporating the average tax on similar products (measured in values) in 
year 2002 in the trade flow from the UK to Kenya 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 




























Excluding  outliers  No No Yes No Yes 
Excluding products lacking 
observations on quantities  No No No Yes  Yes 
No. of observations  1078  1078  966  659  593 
R
2  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Note: Robust t-values in parentheses, accounting for clustering of standard errors by four-digit HS code. *** 
indicates significance at 1% level; ** at 5% level; and * at10% level respectively. 
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Table A.23 Evasion in physical quantities in year 2000 in the trade flow from the UK 
to Kenya 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 




























Excluding products lacking 
observations on Avg(Tax_o)  No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Excluding  outliers  No No Yes No No Yes 
No.  of  observations  794 551 713 551 551 495 
R
2  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Note: Robust t-values in parentheses, accounting for clustering of standard errors by four-digit HS code. *** 
indicates significance at 1% level; ** at 5% level; and * at10% level respectively. 
 
Table A.24 Evasion in physical quantities in year 2002 in the trade flow from the UK 
to Kenya 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 




























Excluding products lacking 
observations on Avg(Tax_o)  No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Excluding  outliers  No  No Yes No No Yes 
No.  of  observations  839 585 755 585 585 525 
R
2  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Note: Robust t-values in parentheses, accounting for clustering of standard errors by four-digit HS code. *** 
indicates significance at 1% level; ** at 5% level; and * at10% level respectively. 
 